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A b strac t. We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m 
objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the 
algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner 
both for linear and for weak preference orders.
1. In trod u ction
A classical problem in the theory of social choice is the determination of the probability of 
the occurrence of a Condorcet winner in an election. Consider a committee of n members 
to be called voters, faced with the choice between m alternatives. Suppose that each voter 
expresses an order of preference for these alternatives. Such a set of n preference orders 
is called a profile. An alternative c is said to be the Condorcet winner or, simply, winner 
of this profile if for every other alternative a the number of voters who prefer c to a is 
strictly larger than the number of voters who prefer a to c. Clearly, the occurrence of 
such a winner is a desirable situation in this form of group decision making. However, as 
is well known, a Condorcet winner need not exist; not even if the committee has an odd 
number of members, each having pronounced preferences. This regrettable fact is known 
as the no-winner form of Condorcet’s paradox [Gehrlein 1983, p. 162] after the Marquis de 
Condorcet [1785, 1789] who is generally credited with its discovery [Riker, 1961, p. 901; 
Black, 1971, Chapter 18; Young, 1988; Van Deemen, 1997, Chapter 3]. See Riker [1961, 
p. 901] and Gehrlein [1983, p. 163] for references on the history and (re)discoveries of the 
paradox.
The problem to be addressed here is: determine the probability P(n, m) (and, likewise, 
P * (n,m)) for the occurrence of a Condorcet winner if the voters choose their preference 
orders independently and uniformly from the set of all possible linear (or weak) orders of 
the alternatives. Here, a weak order is a linear order on a partition of the alternatives 
into non-empty blocks, where the alternatives inside a single block are considered equally 
eligible by the voter who expresses the weak order in question.
Except for Jones, Radcliff, Taber and Timpone [1995] who study P  as well as P *, previous 
studies of these probabilities only consider P . Examples are: Garman & Kamien, 1968; 
Niemi & Weisberg, 1968; DeMeyer & Plott, 1970; May, 1971; Gehrlein &Fishburn, 1976; 
Gehrlein, 1983. All of these studies consider profiles of (random) linear orders that result 
from independent sampling without replacement of the m alternatives. Here we choose 
to assign independent random scores to the alternatives, and take the orders induced by 
these scores as (random) linear or weak orders of preference.
A profile can have only one Condorcet winner as here defined. There are two rules in the 
literature for designating an alternative c as to be majority preferred to an alternative a. 
Let N(ac) denote the number of voters who prefer a to c. For c to be majority preferred 
to a, the majority rule (e.g., Sen [1970, p. 23]) requires N  (ca) > N  (ac) whereas the simple 
majority rule (e.g., Fishburn [1973, p. 18]) requires this inequality to be strict. If n is even, 
applying the majority rule to all pairs of alternatives does not necessarily yield a unique 
Condorcet winner (provided there exists one) since it may happen that N (ac) =  N (ca) 
for some pairs {a, c}. Accordingly, studies on P  and P *, such as the ones just mentioned, 
only consider profiles with n odd. As our approach holds for odd and even n alike, we will 
use the simple majority rule. So, in contrast to, e.g., Kelly [1987, p. 15] and Van Deemen 
[1999, p. 172], we do not allow non-unique winners.
By simulating a million elections on a computer for various pairs (n, m), Jones et al. [1995] 
obtained a table of estimates of P(n, m) and P * (n, m) which to our knowledge is the
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largest made so far. In their simulations they sampled linear orders by the algorithm of 
selection without replacement among the m alternatives. For the purpose of sampling weak 
orders of the m alternatives they drew up a list of all possible weak orders, and then chose 
elements from this list at random. Now, the number of weak orders on m objects behaves 
asymptotically as m!/2(log 2)m+1. (See [J.P. Barthelemy, 1980; Bailey, 1998]. The factor 
log 2 is the radius of convergence of the generating function F (z) =  (2 — ez ) - 1  in (3).) Due 
to this fast increase as a function of m, the above listing procedure is only feasible for m 
up to about 15.
In this paper we present an algorithm for sampling weak orders on m alternatives which 
works for arbitrarily high values of m, and yields all possible weak orders with equal 
probabilities. It runs as follows. First we choose a ‘maximum score’ K  according to a 
certain well-chosen probability distribution nm on the natural numbers. Then we choose for 
every alternative independently a score from 1 to K  according to the uniform distribution. 
The sample order is then the weak order of these scores.
An attractive feature of this algorithm is that the alternatives obtain independent scores. 
In fact, also for linear orders there exists an algorithm with this property: instead of 
selecting alternatives without replacement, we can allot to each of them independently 
a random score, uniformly distributed over the interval [0 , 1 ], and then take the (linear) 
order of these real-valued scores as our sample order. Generating preference orders by 
independent scores greatly facilitates the analysis of P  and P *.
A further simplification of the calculation of P  and P * results from the observation that 
the probability for the occurrence of a Condorcet winner equals m times the probability 
that a particular alternative wins. We choose one ‘pivot’ alternative once and for all, and 
let the other m — 1 alternatives compete with it independently. This approach enables us 
to give expressions for P(n, m) and P * (n, m) in which m plays a fairly simple role, so that 
the study of asymptotic behavior for large m comes within reach.
2. T h e num ber o f w eak orders
Let R be a binary relation on a finite set A. We recall that R is called connected if for all 
a, b G A we have either aRb or bRa, transitive if aRb and bRc imply aRc, and antisymmetric 
if aRb and bRa imply that a =  b. A weak order on A is a binary relation on A that is both 
connected and transitive. A linear order is a weak order which is antisymmetric [Krantz, 
Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971, p. 14; Roberts 1979, p. 15; Michell, 1990, p. 167].
Interpreting A as comprising m alternatives, we let W be a weak order on A, and let ~  
denote the binary relation on A defined by
a ~  b iff aWb and bWa .
In the case of a voter’s preference order we interpret a ~  b as meaning that the voter is 
indifferent with respect to a and b. Let a := { b G A | b ~  a } denote the indifference 
class of a, and A /~  the set of indifference classes that W induces on A. Let k denote the
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cardinality of A /~ . Clearly 1 < k < m. The binary relation L on A /~  given by aLb iff 
aWb, is a linear order [Roberts 1979, p. 31, Theorem 1.2.; Krantz et. al. 1971, p. 16]. 
Conversely every linear order on a partition of A into k nonempty subsets determines a 
unique weak order on A with # (A /~ ) =  k. Therefore, the number w(m,k) of such weak 
orders is given by
w(m, k) =  k! S(m, k) := (— 1 ) ^ M  (k — i)m ,
i=0 W
where S(m,k), a Stirling number of the second kind, gives the number of partitions of a 
set of m elements into k nonempty subsets [Comtet, 1974, p.204; Van Lint and Wilson, 
1993, p. 71, 105-6]. The total number Wm of weak orders on m objects is thus given by
m
Wm = w(m, 1) +  ■ ■ ■ +  w(m, m) =  k! S(m, k) . (1)
k=i
The quickest way to find Wm is by use of the recursion
w(m, k) =  k(w(m — 1 , k) +  w(m — 1 , k — 1 )) , (2)
which follows from the corresponding recursion for the Stirling numbers [Van Lint and 
Wilson, 1993, p. 105]. Equation (2) can be understood directly as follows. A weak order 
on {1 , . .  ., m} into k blocks can be obtained either by weakly ordering {1 , . . . ,  m — 1 } into 
k blocks, and then adding m to one of the k blocks, or by weakly ordering {1 , . . . ,  m — 1 } 
into k — 1 blocks, and inserting the block {m} in one of k ways. The calculation of w(m, k) 
and, from these, Wm is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1 here
For the sequel a second expression for Wm is relevant. 
T heorem  1. For all m G N,
œ km
Wm =
2k+ 1 k= 0
Proof. Define for k G N and z G C sufficiently small,
œ zm
Fk(z) := w(m ,k) —  .m!m=0
Then by (2) we have for k > 1:
^  zm—i zm
Fk(z) =  > w(m, k) 7------ —r =  > w(m +  1 ,k ) — 7
kV 7 ^  v 7 (m — 1 )! ^  v 7 m!m=  ^ m=0
z m
= k(w(m, k) +  w(m,k — 1^ —  =  k(Fk (z) +  Fk-i(z))( (
m!m=0
3
The unique solution of this system of differential equations with boundary conditions 
F0(z) =  1 for all z and Fk (0) =  1 for all k is
Fk(z) =  (ez — 1 )k .
Now put
F (z) := £  W m i-i . (3)
z— / r n  !
°° zm
 >  -m!m=0
Then, because of (1) and noting that w(m, k) =  0 for k > m, 
F  (z) =  £  Fk (z)
k=0
1 1 1  ^= ____ 1____  =  1 = __ 2___= y -  1 f 1 ez
1 — (ez — 1 ) 2 — ez 1 — 2 ez 2 ^2
œ „kz œ 1 œ lm vm œ vm (  œ lm \^—"V e ^—r 1 ^—r k z ^—r z I ^—r k \
=  Z_^  2k+1 =  ^  2k+1 ^  m! =  ü  1 2^+1 / .k=0 k=0 m=0 m=0 k=0
The result follows from comparison with (3). We note that the power series for F (z) 
has positive coefficients, and radius of convergence log 2 , so that on [0, log 2) the above 
interchange of summations is justified. □
3. G enerating  random  weak orders
From Theorem 1 it follows that the sequence nm (1), nm (2), nm (3),.. .  of positive numbers 
given by
1 km
nm(k) :=  Wm ■ 2 +  (4)
sums up to 1, and hence defines a probability distribution on the natural numbers. This 
distribution plays a crucial role in our algorithm. First we need a lemma.
Lem m a 2. Let l E N. Then
OO
2k+1 l 
k=l v 7
Proof. In an infinite sequence of tosses with a fair coin the probability that head comes 
up for the (l +  1 )-th time in the (k +  1 )-th toss is
1 /k
2k+ ^  l,
The lemma expresses the fact that the (l +  1)-th head is certain to come up eventually. □
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T heorem  3. Let A be a set of m elements, m > 1. Let a stochastic weak order R on A 
be generated by the following algorithm:
(i) Draw an integer-valued random variable K  according to the probability distribution 
nm. (See the instruction below).
(ii) To each a G A assign a random score Xa according to the uniform distribution on 
{1 , . . . , K  }.
(iii) Put aRb iff Xa < Xb.
Then all of the Wm possible weak orders on A are obtained with the same probability 
1 /Wm.
Proof. Consider a fixed weak order R on A. As indicated in Section 2, R is completely 
determined by a number l > 1 and a partition of A into l nonempty disjoint blocks, 
B 1, B2, . . . ,  B i, by the prescription:
aRb iff a G B¿ and b G Bj with i < j  .
Therefore the score assignment X  : A ^  {1, 2 , . . . , K } : a ^  Xa induces the weak order R 
in step (iii) iff X takes a constant value on each block B¿ of R which is a strictly increasing 
function of i. Now, any strictly increasing function {1, . . . ,  l} ^  {1,.. ., K } is completely 
determined by its range, so for fixed K  there are functions which induce the weak 
order R on A. (We take (^) to be 0 if K  < l.)
Since the number of possible assignments X : A ^  {1, 2, . . .  , K } is K m, it follows that 
a fixed weak order R having l blocks is produced by the algorithm with the following 
probability
œ
P[R is produced] =  £  P[K =  k] ■ P[R is produced|K =  k]
k=l
£k=l m 
oo
Wm 2k+1 km l
1 k
=  1 ^  1 ( k  
=  W m k L  l )  -  W,
where in the last equality sign Lemma 2 is used. □
Remark. The above reasoning yields an independent proof of Theorem 1: First define Wm 
as the infinite sum in Theorem 1, and then use the proof of Theorem 3 to show that
£  W ^ =  ! .m
It then follows that Wm is the number of weak orders of A.
Instruction. In order to draw repeatedly a random variable K  with distribution nm, as 
required in step (i), one may proceed as follows.
1. Before the start of the simulations:
(1a.) Calculate Wm using the recursion (2).
k1 m
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(1b.) Choose a small number S such that 1/5 is of the order of the total number of 
weak orders to be generated, and find N  G N so large that
N km
Wm -  £  2k+r < S -
k=1
(1c.) Fill an array with the partial sums S0, S1, S2, . . . ,  Sn given by
kk jm
Sk : ^ 5 ] 2j + 1  , k =  0, 1 , . . . , N  -  1 ; Sn := Wm .
j =0
2. For each of the weak orders to be sampled:
(2a.) Let Y := Wm • RND(1), where RND(1) produces a random number uniformly 
over [0,1].
(2b.) Let K  be the least integer for which Sk  > Y.
Then for all k G {1, . . . ,  N  — 1}:
1 1 km 
P[K =  k] =  P[Sk- 1  < Y < Sk] =  —  (Sk — Sk-1) =  —  =  nm(k) .
With probability less than S the random variable K  takes the value N  where actually it 
should take a larger value.
4. P rob ab ilities  o f  C ondorcet w inners from  profiles pro­
duced  by in d ep en d en t scores
As a spin-off from the algorithm in Section 3 we are enriched with a general idea. Ap­
parently we can generate random weak orders from independent random scores (Xa)a(=A 
with identical discrete probability distributions. Obviously we can also generate linear 
orders in this way if only we take the probability distribution of the scores continuous, 
thus excluding indifference.
P roposition  4. Let A be a finite set of m elements, m > 1. Let a stochastic order R on 
A be generated by the following algorithm:
(i) To each a G A assign a random score Xa according to the uniform distribution on 
[0 , 1].
(ii) Put aRb iff Xa < Xb.
Then with probability 1 the order R is a linear order and each of the m! possible linear 
orders on A occurs with equal probability 1 /m !.
This idea can be used to simulate elections. However, computer simulations to estimate 
probabilities are typically run for want of an analytic expression. So, let us first see what 
can be done analytically with this insight. We are interested in profiles (R1, R2, • • •, Rn) of 
linear or weak orders on the set A of alternatives. We say that a G A is majority preferred 
to b G A (and we write aMb) if
# {  j  < n | aRjb } < # {  j  < n | bRja } .
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(Note that aRjb stands for ‘voter j  prefers b to a ’.) An alternative c G A is called the 
Condorcet winner of the profile (R1, R2, • • •, Rn) if
VaeA\{c} : cMa . (5)
It was observed by Niemi and Weisberg [1968, p. 321] that, since there can be at most 
one winner, and the alternatives all have equal probabilities to win, the probability for a 
majority winner to occur equals m times the probability that any given alternative wins.
So let us pick out a pivot alternative c G A and consider the probability that (5) is the case. 
The different events [cMa] and [cMb] with a =  b are in general statistically dependent. 
Indeed, taking for example n = 1 , A =  {a, b, c}, and linear preference orders, we find that
P[cMa] =  P[cMb] =  1 ,
whereas
P[cMa and cMb] =  3 =  2 x 1 .
Of course this statistical dependence greatly complicates the calculation of the probability 
for (5) to occur. However, when independent scores are used to generate the profile, the 
events [cMa] and [cMb] for different a, b and c become independent when conditioned on 
the scores Xj:, X,2, • • •, X,” of the pivot (and, in the weak case, also on the maximum scores 
K 1 , K 2 ,..., Kn).
So, considering linear orders, for any (x1 ,x2, ••• ,xn) G [0,1]n let P (x i ,x2 ,_,x„)(E) denote 
the probability of an event E  conditioned on X ,1 =  x1, . . . ,  Xn =  xn . Then,
1 1
P[VaGA\{c} : cMa] = I ••• P(xi ,X2 ,-,*„ ) [Va£A\{c} : cM a]dx1 dx2 • • • dxn ,
0 0
/1 p1 / \ m —1• J  ÍP(xi,x2, -^,xn)[cM an dx1 dx2 ••• dxn ,
where a is an arbitrary alternative different from c. So we only have to calculate the 
probability P(I 1lx2,- ,Xn)[cMa] for some a =  c. However, since the preference orders 
R 1, R2, • • •, Rn are independent, this latter probability is equal to
£  n  P(xi,X2,•••,*„) [cR"<j)a] ,?w(j)H   ,  cR 
j =1
V  . ^(j)> 0
where [cRja] denotes the event that voter j  prefers c to a, and [cR—1a] the event that voter 
j  prefers a to c, and the sum is over all sequences u  of 1 ’s and —1 ’s whose sum w(j) 
is positive, meaning that there are more voters who prefer c to a (these are indicated by 
the 1’s in u) than there are who prefer a to c (indicated by the —1’s). Now, given that 
X j =  Xj for j  =  1 , . . . ,  n, the probability that voter j  prefers c to a is P[Xa < Xj] =  Xj, 
while the probability that he prefers a to c is 1 — x j .
Collecting results we conclude:
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T heorem  5. The probability P  (n, m) for the ocurrence of a Condorcet winner when n 
voters express linear preference orders on m alternatives is given by
P  (n, m) =  m / • •  / Sn (xi , x2, ••• ,x n )m - 1  dxi dx2 ••• dxn ,
./o ./o
where n
Sn (xi ,x2, ••• ,xn) := £  Ü  (xj ) ,
“6{1, -1}n j =1
V  ^(j)>0 j
and
f 1 (x) := x and f - 1  (x) := 1 — x .
In an analogous way we obtain the corresponding theorem for weak orderings.
T heorem  6 . The probability P*(n, m) for the ocurrence of a Condorcet winner when n 
voters express weak preference orders with respect to m alternatives is given by
°° OO / i \ k1 +--- +kn+n k1 kn
P *(n, m) =  W n £  ••• £  M  £  ••• £  Sn(k1 ,••• , kn x 1 , • • • ,xn) m - 1 ,
m fc1 = 1 kn = 1  ^ x1 = 1 xn = 1
where n
Sn (k1 ,k2, ••• ,kn ; x 1 ,x2 , ••• ,xn ) :  =  £  Ü  g"(j) (k  , xj ) ,
^e{-1,o,1}n j = 1 
. “(j')>0 j
and
g1 (k , x) :=  x — 1 , g0 ( k , x ) : = 1 , and g- 1  (k,x):  =  k — x .
Proof. We suppose that each voter j  determines his preference order by first choosing 
Kj according to the distribution and, then, for each alternative a G A picks a score 
Xa G { 1 , . . . , K j } at random. Let k : =  (k1 ,k2, •••, kn ) and x := (x1 , x2, ••• ,xn), and 
for an event E  let Pk,x (E) denote the probability that E  occurs given that K 1 =  k1, 
K 2 =  k2, . . . ,  Kn =  kn , and X^ =  x1, X;? =  x2, . . . ,  X^ =  xn. We write a > j b or aRjb if 
voter j  prefers a to b, a < j b or aR - 1  b if voter j  prefers b to a, and a ~ j b or aR0b if voter 
j  is indifferent with respect to a and b. Then we have for a, c G A with a =  c,
Pk,x [c > j a]
Pfc,x[c ~ j a]
Pk,x[c <j a]
=  P[xj > x ¿ |Kj =  kj ] =
xj — 1
kj
=  P[xj =  x a  |Kj =  kj ] =  -
=  P[xj < x a  |Kj =  kj ] =
kj
kj — xj
j
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Pk,x[cMa] =  P[cR^(1) a and cR^(2)a and .. .  and cR^(n) a]
we{-1,0,1}n
V  . ^(j)>0 j
=  y -  g^(j)(kj , xj ) =  S* f e  x)
=  A A k • =  k  • • • k .kj k 1 knojG{-1,0,1}n j =1 j 1 n
V  w(j)>0 j
Since the scores Xa are all independent given K 1, K2, • • •, Kn, we have 
P*(n,m ) =  mP[Va£A\{c} : cMa]
O O k1 k„ 1 1
= m £  • • • £  nm (k1) • • • n .  (kn) £  • • • £  k-----k"Pk,x[VaeA\{c} : cMa]
i i  k 1 knk1 =1 kn = 1 X1 =1 xn = 1
m O O km km 1 k1 kn /  S* (k x) \ m —1ill ^  ^ ^  ^ k1 kn -L V'  ^ V'  ^ ƒ S j k, x J
=  W ^ ^  ••• 2k1 + 1 • • • 2kn + 1 k1 ••• kn ^  ••• M  k1 ••• knm k1 = 1 kn = 1 X1 = 1 Xn = 1
In this expression all the factors kj cancel, and the result is obtained. □
It follows th a t
5. Som e particu lar cases
In this section we demonstrate the use of the formulas in Theorems 5 and 6 by calculating 
P(n, m) and P * (n, m) in certain particular cases.
5.1. S ingle voter case
Obviously P (1 , m) =  1 for all m since a single linear order always has a top element. As
S1 (x) =  x, this is just what Theorem 5 ascertains:
n1 1
m  xm - 1  dx =  xm =  1 .
Jo 0
For a single weak preference order the situation is already nontrivial: the top cluster may 
contain more than one alternative. (The voter hesitates as to which alternative is the 
best). It is not difficult to see, however, that
mWm- 1P * (1 , m) =
W.m
Indeed, there are m ways to choose a winning alternative, and then Wm - 1  ways to weakly 
order the remaining ones below it. As an illustration we calculate this result now from 
Theorem 6 : since S* (k,x) =  x — 1,
o  z., \ k+1 k o  o  / -, \ k+1
m ^  ^ ( x _  i r - 1  =  m v u „ , _1  ^  ( l \P *(i,m) =  W . E  ± E (* — 1 ) m_ 1 =  W j E « ’” - 1  £  2
k=1 v 7 x=1  u=0 k=u+1  v 7
m ^  um - 1  mWm - 1
= W . ^  =  W .  .
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It is of interest to note that P * (1,m) is not decreasing in m and that the asymptotic 
behavior of Wm is such that
lim P*(1 , m ) = l o g 2 .
5.2. T w o voters
Two voters with linear preference orders yield a Condorcet winner iff they put the same 
cadidate on top of their lists. The probability for this to happen is
P (2 , m) =  — .
m
This is obtained from Theorem 5 by realizing that S2 (x,y) =  xy, so that 
P ( 2 ,m) =  m f  f  xm —1 dx^ f  f  ym -1dy^ =  ~  .
'0 /  \J0 m2 m
The weak case is more complicated than this but can still be greatly simplified since 
S*(k, x) does not depend on k (see the proof of Lemma 7). For n =  2 we denote k by 
(k, l), and x by (x, y).
Lem m a 7. For all m > 1:
m 1
m t ' - \m- 1 , /i l m  1 W 1 x1/2
m l=1
Proof. To find S*(k, l; x,y) we must sum over u  G {(1,1), (1, 0), (0,1)}. So
S 2 (M ; x ,y) =  (x -  1)(y -  1) +  (x -  1) +  (y -  1) =  xy -  1 .
We calculate:
o  o  , ..X k+l+2 k l
P  * (2 ,m) =  W r  £  £  ( 2 ) £ £ ( * »  -  D " - 1
m k=1 l=1 V 7 x=1 y=1
00o^ o^ / wo / .. \ k+1 \  / oo / .. \ l+1 \
m £  £ (xy -  1 ) . —1 ( E  f i )  )  ( g  ( ! )  j
o o
m ' o ' o ,  Mm_1 1£ £ (xy -  1)
W 2  2x ■ 2ym x=1 y=1
o  o  - 1  l l
m ^  I -  1 1 ( - 1 )m -l- 1  x y
I l / ( ) 2x2ym x=1 y=1 l=0  ^ '
(oo 00 - m—1 oo 00 / - \ l l^ ^ n m —1 1 i l m  -  1 u _ i a " —l—1 x y
1 ^ 1 ^ ( ) 2x2y Z-^Z-^Z-^  y l y ( ) 2x2y
x=1 y=1 l=1  x=1 y=1
-  10 -
lxl
V  — = 2Wl for l > 1 ./  -j 2X l _
x=1
□
Let us check the formula for P *(2, m). It is easily verified that b is the winning alternative 
in 3 of the =  9 ordered pairs of weak orders on {a, b}. Hence, P *(2, 2) =  2 x 3/9. This 
concurs with (6). Examining the ordered pairs of weak orders on {a1, . . . ,  am}, it turns 
out that a 1 appears as Condorcet winner in 29, 579, 19997 of these pairs for m =  3, 4, 5, 
respectively. These frequencies also result from the part within the brackets in (6). So, 
P *(2, 3) =  3 x 29/132 =  .515, P *(2, 4) =  4 x 579/752 =  .412, P *(2, 5) =  5 x 19997/5412 = 
.342.
The result follows from the fact th a t
5.3. T hree or m ore voters
Our approach does not permit treatment of large numbers of voters since the polynomials 
Sn and S* become forbiddingly complicated for large n. So, we confine ourselves to 
considering P(n, m) for n =  3, 4, 5, 6 , and m =  3 , . . . ,  10. We first associate to Sn the 
functions Tj (x1, . . . ,  xn) to denote the sum of all j- th  order products of the arguments of 
Sn, j  < n. Now, using Theorem 5 we have, for n =  3,
S3(x, y, z) =  xyz +  xy(1 — z) +  xz(1 — y) +  yz(1 — x) =  xy +  xz +  yz — 2xyz 
=  T2 (x, y, z) -  2xyz
so that 1 1 1
P (3,m) =  m  ƒ (T2 (x,y,z) -  2xyz) m —1 dxdydz.
0 0 0
Since, for n =  4, a strict majority comprises 4 or 3 voters,
S4(x, y, z, t) =  xyzt +  xyz(1 -  t) +  xyt(1 -  z) +  xzt(1 -  y) +  yzt(1 -  x)
so that 1 1 1 1
P (4, m) =  m  /  (T3 (x,y,z,t) -  3xyzt)m —1 dxdydzdt
0 0 0 0
We similarly obtain, omitting the arguments of the Tj for brevity,
1 1 1 1 1
P (5,m) =  m  ƒ (T3 -  3T4 +  6xyztu) m —1 dxdydzdtdu,
0 0 0 0 0  
1 1 1 1 1 1
P (6 , m) =  m  ƒ ƒ (T4 -  4T5 +  10xyztuv)m —1 dxdydzdtdudv.
0 0 0 0 0 0
The exact calculation of P(n, m) for n =  3, 4, 5, 6 , and m up to about 20 is a matter of 
seconds for an algebraic program such as Maple. Table 2 gives the results in the exact 
form of the rational fractions resulting from these calculations as well as in real numbers.
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Garman & Kamien [1968, p. 314] computed 1 -  P(n, m) as multinomial probabilities for 
some small and odd n and some small m. The rational fractions they report are the 
complements of the corresponding ones in Table 2. The same holds for Gillett [1977] who 
computed 1 -  P(n, 3) also for some even n. The estimates of P(n, m) that Jones et al 
[1995] obtained by simulations are confined to odd n and values of m up to 15. The 
estimates they report for n =  3, 5 deviate at most 0.002 from the corresponding ones in 
Table 2. Finally, let us check by way of example two of our results for P (n  odd, m even) 
for the linear dependence on the P(n, j)  with j  odd and < m as established by Gehrlein & 
Fishburn [1976, p. Theorem 2]. Taking the coefficients a m from their Table III [o.c., 1976, 
p. 24], we find
17 21 359
P  (3, 6) =  +  a 6 P  (3, 3) +  P  (3, 5) =  3 -  5 ■ -  +  3 ■ ^  =  ^ ,
P (5, 8) =  a? +  a ? P (5, 3) +  a 5 P (5, 5) +  a ? P (5, 7)
67 „ 32019 „ 608721061 767419
=  _ 1 7 + 2 8 - ____14 • _______+ 4 - _________= _______
72 40000 864360000 1152480 ’
which agrees with the calculated values in Table 2 . Although for large n the polynomials 
Sn and Sn become more and more complicated, asymptotics of P(n, m) and P*(n, m) 
for large m may well be feasible. Using the above formulas for P(n, m) it can be shown 
that P (3, m), and hence P(n, m) for all n, tends to 0 as m tends to to, P (3, m) being 
strictly decreasing as a function of m. These results were proved before by May [1971] and 
Fishburn, Gehrlein & Maskin [1979, Theorem 1], respectively.
Table 2 here
We checked the formula for P * (n, m) in Theorem 6 only for the case (n =  3, m =  3). An 
examination of the 133 ordered triples of weak orders on {a, b, c} shows that 486 of those 
triples have c as Condorcet winner. Hence, P * (3, 3) =  3 x 486/133 =  .664. This concurs 
with Jones et al [1995, Table 3], who report the complement. We programmed the formula 
for P *(3, 3) in Fortran, putting S =  .001 and, thus, N  =  23 (see the Instruction in Section 
3), and taking 23 as upper limit for k¿,¿ =  1, 2, 3. The summations yield 485.8889 and 
tend to 486 in the limit for increasing upper limits for the k . So, the formula agrees with 
the above. However, the number of terms S* that were added to obtain 485.8889 was 
21,024,576. Clearly, the formula is not very well suited for computational purposes.
6. D iscu ssion
Going by independent scores we obtained an algorithm for generating random weak orders, 
and formulas for P(n, m) and P *(n, m). We have confined ourselves to profiles that satisfy 
the Impartial Culture (IC) condition, an assumption made in almost all studies on this 
subject. What progress is in these contributions? We evaluate this question with respect
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to the present state of the study of the development of closed-form expressions for these 
probabilities.
For a fixed order of the m! possible linear orders of m alternatives, let n =  (n1, . . . ,  nm|) 
characterize a profile with nj voters expressing the j- th  linear order of preference, and let 
P =  (p1, . . .  , Pmi) comprise the probabilities of a voter expressing the j- th  linear order, 
j  =  1 , . . . ,  m!. Listing the closed-form expressions of P(n, m) in the literature, Gehrlein 
[1983, p. 170] finds the most tractable, essentially multinomial, representation of P(n, 3|p) 
and P  (n, 4|p) in Gehrlein & Fishburn [1976]. Taking p =  (1/m!, . . . ,  1/m!) in accord 
with IC, and determining the constraints on n for which a profile of linear orders enjoys 
a Condorcet winner, these latter authors obtained computable expressions for P(n, 3) 
and P(n, 4) which they were able to evaluate for odd n up to 49. Gehrlein & Fishburn 
[1976] concentrated on P(n, m) with m odd since they showed [o.c., 1976, Theorem 2] 
that, for all even m > 4 and n odd, P(n, m) can be written as a linear combination 
of the P(n, j)  with j  odd and less than m, and with coefficients being independent of 
n. In developing their expression of P(n, 4), they made use of the remark of Niemi & 
Weisberg [1968, p. 213] that P(n, m) equals m times the probability that any particular 
alternative wins. Using this remark they also obtained an expression for P(n, 5), and 
noted [o.c., p. 25] that, more generally, expressions for P  (n, 7) ,P (n, 9), . . .  can similarly 
be obtained. Gehrlein & Fishburn [1979] obtained computable expressions for P(n, 7) 
and P(n, 9). These expressions are growingly complex for increasing m, and increasingly 
difficult to evaluate for larger n. In fact, Gehrlein [1983, Table 1] evaluates these formulas 
for the (odd n, odd m) pairs (< 49, 3), (< 35, 5), (< 9, 7), (< 9, 9), (< 7, 11), . . .  , 
(< 7, 17), (< 5, 19), . . .  , (< 5, 25), and uses an approximation for evaluations in the pairs 
where m or n exceeds a limit as here indicated.
In the approach taken here, these roles of n and m have in a sense been reversed. The 
expression of P(n, m) in Theorem 5 is hardly more difficult to evaluate for larger m, even 
allows study of asymptotic behavior as m ^  to, but increases in complication quickly 
for larger n, to become intractable for values of n from about 11 onwards. On the other 
hand, it is valid for odd and even values of n and m alike. To the best of our knowledge, 
calculations of P (4, m) and P (6 , m) [Table 2] are not in the literature.
As regards weak orders, our expression in Theorem 6 for P*(n, m) is mainly of theoretical 
interest. It is hardly computable except for the smallest values of n and m, and even in 
these cases its evaluation is more involved than a direct check of the Wn possible profiles 
for a Condorcet winner. We can only point to the small progress on the case n =  2 in 
Section 5.2.
We regard as main contributions of this essay (i) the algorithm for generating random weak 
orders, and (ii) the approach by independent scores. The algorithm facilitates simulations 
of weak orders and, thereby, numerical estimates of P * (n, m). For instance, the algorithm 
takes less than one second for generating 1001 random weak orders of 6 alternatives and, 
thus, considerably improves the procedure of Jones et al. [1995] who needed quite some 
computer time for simulating an election with n =  1001 and m =  6 [o.c., 1995, footnote 
10]. Also, the algorithm almost naturally prompts the approach by independent scores
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that leads to new expressions for P(n, m) and P *(n, m). Unfortunately, all of these de­
velopments only pertain to profiles that satisfy the condition of IC from which we did not 
escape.
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T able 1
w(m, k) and Wm
m j  k
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wm
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
3 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 13
4 1 14 36 24 0 0 0 75
5 1 30 150 240 120 0 0 541
6 1 62 540 1560 1800 720 0 4683
7 1 126 1806 8400 16800 15120 5040 47293
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Table 2 
P  (n, m)
n j  m ^
3 4 5 6 7
3 17 8 21 359 33569 
° 18 9 25 450 44100
.944 .889 .840 .798 .761
4 4 197 1107 1043 15359 
^ 9 576 4000 4500 77175
.444 .342 .277 .232 .199
5 67 31 32019 269513 608721061 
d 72 36 40000 360000 864360000
.931 .861 .800 .749 .704
6 989 1037 472549 1078499 13057391131 
° 1944 2592 1440000 3888000 54454680000
.509 .400 .328 .277 .240
8 9 10
536 13913 67079
735 19845 99225
.729 .701 .676
91745 5499323 705967
526848 35562240 5080320
.174 .155 .139
767419 1574336347 37525387727
1152480 2489356800 62233920000
.666 .632 .603
1837328467 9553049400803 23921196935141
8712748800 50812751001600 141146530560000
.211 .188 .169
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